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INTRODUCTION
R
ecently published scientific studies, such as the Stern-
Report1 and the Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (“IPCC”) Assessment Report,2 illustrate
the dire need to curb carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions in order
to combat global climate change. As a result, climate change mit-
igation has become a cornerstone of European energy policy and
is becoming increasingly important in the United States.3 Euro-
pean leaders have agreed on ambitious targets, including a twenty
percent CO2 emission reduction from 1990 levels by 2020. In
view of these European commitments and the nascent carbon
emissions trading regimes underway in the United States, it is
worthwhile to inspect the efficiency of European Union Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”), the central instrument of
European climate policy. This paper presents an empirical analy-
sis of the corporate transaction costs from three German compa-
nies obligated to take part in the EU ETS. The data presented in
this article are among the first systematically surveyed results in
Europe. Under inspection, these costs vary widely by companies
participating in such regimes and can differ by a factor of five. 
The information presented in this article helps identify opti-
mization potential within the German implementation of this
Emissions Trading Scheme and assist in the design of sound
emission trading systems in the United States or elsewhere. As a
result, the countries’ energy policies will be better suited to ful-
fill energy needs with a reduction in greenhouse gases. 
TRANSACTION COSTS
In this article, the term transaction cost is not restricted to
search, negotiation, and decision-making costs. It is used here in
a wider sense to include information and opportunity costs
beyond those directly associated with a good’s transaction. Sim-
plified, all costs that arise in the course of administration and
management of the emissions trade are considered transaction
costs, excluding purchasing or abatement costs (See Table 1).
Generally all transaction costs are “deadweight losses,” as
expenditures for the obligations of the emissions trade cannot be
used to realize emission abatement measures. 
Macroeconomic theory states that transaction costs hinder the
cost-effective allocation of tradable permits as the volume traded
decreases, which results in an increase of macroeconomic abatement
costs.4 However, this aspect is of less importance since a significant
proportion of the transaction costs associated with the EU ETS arises
with non-trade related activities; therefore, the effect on trade volume
is not as significant as new institutional economics would expect.5
Transaction costs are influenced by the frequency, asset
specifics, and uncertainty of the transaction.6 All these factors
are to some degree interrelated with the implementation of the
EU ETS but depend mainly on the size and the type of company
participating in the system.7 For instance, it can be expected that
a pulp and paper company will have higher costs to develop a
trading strategy than a large utility actively engaged in electricity
trade due to the necessary expertise already being developed in
the utility sector. 
EU EMISSIONS TRADING IN GERMANY
The European Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EG8
defines the structural elements of the ETS. As an EU Directive, it
must be implemented into national law in all EU member coun-
tries. In Germany, the Directive was implemented through two
laws and two ordinances.9 The first, the Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Trading Act (“TEHG”) is composed of six sections defin-
ing the ETS framework and how the system functions. The first
section of the Act defines the aim, the criteria for participation in
the system (defined as installations, or sources, with a generation
capacity greater than 20 MWh), and the central terms of the
scheme. The second section requires affected companies to
properly monitor their emissions and to have a permit to run the
installation. The third section of the TEHG sets forth the terms
implementing the national allocation plan and sets allocation
rules. The terms of the actual emission trade are defined in the
fourth part. The fifth and sixth parts contain sanction mecha-
nisms, assign jurisdiction to the German Emissions Trading
Agency (“DEHSt”), and define additional formal requirements.
The Allocation Law of 2005-2007 and the Allocation Ordi-
nance of 2005-2007 govern the allocation for the first commit-
ment period from 2005 to 2007.10 The former outlines the
allocation rules, whereas the latter contains all the technical def-
initions and details necessary for calculating the exact number of
EU Allowances (“EUA”) an installation receives. 
Germany allocates emission credits to sources through a
range of methods. Primarily, emission allocation is based on
benchmarks or historical emissions; however, the political
process has resulted in special rules for certain facilities. For
instance, exceptions are made for certain efficient technologies,
such as combined heat and power plants, or firms experiencing
undue hardships. As a result, there is a fairly complicated set of
58 different possible combinations of allocations rules that the
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DEHSt, as the executive agency, must navigate. Thus, regulatory
complexity is a main driver of transaction costs in the first com-
mitment period. Moreover, a cost ordinance determines which
fees a company has to pay to participate in the EU ETS. The
TEHG specifies that participating companies must bear the cost
of the DEHSt through these fees, making the administration of
the EU ETS cost neutral for the German government.
Table 1 presents eight categories summarizing transaction
costs facing companies participating in the EU ETS. Specifi-
cally, these costs consist of application, implementation of an
emissions trading management, monitoring, reporting, abate-
ment measures, trade related activities,11 and development or
adaptation of strategic considerations. The cost for appeals and
other legal claims belong to the application category but are not
analyzed in the following case studies.12
TABLE 1: TRANSACTION COST CATEGORIES
Category Transaction Costs
Application • Quantification of historic emissions
• Development of emission outlooks 
• Decision for an application rule 
• Compilation of an application
• Where necessary, compilation of a 
benchmark
• Verification of the application
• Fees for annual allocation
• Fees for emissions register
Implementation  • Information, training
of an • Assessment of obligation to 
emissions participate in the EU ETS
management • Set up of organizational structures 
and assignment of responsibilities
• Adaptation or purchase of software
• Material costs
Monitoring • Design of a monitoring concept
• Implementation of an internal 
monitoring system
• Ongoing monitoring
Reporting • Quantification of annual emissions 
• Compilation of an emissions report
• Verification of an emissions report
• Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
Abatement measures • Identification of abatement measures
• Decision about abatement measures
Trade • Transactions fees (exchange fees, 
broker fees, clearing)
• Trade
• Market observation
Strategy • Definition of a risk strategy
• Definition of a trade strategy
• Definition of a abatement strategy
CASE STUDIES
Case studies are well suited to analyze transaction costs,
because it is possible to effectively consider unique characteris-
tics facing the corporation that cannot be gleaned from surveys
or simplistic questionnaires. For instance, observed transaction
costs arise in different parts of the companies and their underly-
ing time and cost expenditures are typically not separately
recorded from other ongoing business routines. For this case
study, three companies were chosen and several corporate
employees interviewed in-depth after the first emissions reports
were sent to the DEHSt in April 2006. The data surveyed can be
considered to be precise because all information was verified by
interviewees. It should be emphasized that the small sample size
indicates that this data is not representative. For that reason, no
aggregate figures or extrapolations are presented in this paper. 
The first case study is one of the four major utilities in Ger-
many whose twenty installations emitted about eleven million
tons (“Mt”) CO2 in 2005. Due to the magnitude of the emissions
and their direct relation to the firm’s core business processes,
corporate exposure to the EU ETS can be regarded as high. The
company analyzed in the second case study is a typical medium-
sized utility, which is active in municipal public services like
water and gas supply. Its three installations are only used for dis-
trict heating and reserve or peak load production. Therefore, less
CO2 is emitted which—in combination with the diversity of its
operations—leads only to a medium exposure to the EU ETS.
The third case study analyzes a major lime works company. The
emissions of twelve installations add up to about two Mt CO2 per
year. As the added value per ton of CO2 is low in mineral pro-
cessing industries, emission levels result in a high exposure to
the EU ETS. 
TABLE 2: CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
Major Pubic Major
Utility Services Lime Works 
(MU) Utility (PS) Co. (LW)
Employees 18,000 1,100 900
(2005) (2005) (2004)
Installations 18 2 12
Total annual EUA 
[t CO2] 1,000,000 62,000 2,000,000
Average EUA 
per installation 
p.a. [t CO2] 600,000 31,000 150,000
Reported emissions 
in 2005 [t CO2] 11,000,000 64,000 1,800,000
Surplus/shortage 
2005 -1,000,000 -2,000 200,000
Exposure to EU 
ETS High Medium High
49 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
50SPRING 2007
Results
In 2006, transaction costs for the major utility (“MU”)
totaled 2.8 million euro, 52,000 euro for the medium-sized pub-
lic services utility (“PS”), and 270,000 for the major lime works
company (“LW”). One-time costs, such as setting up the neces-
sary corporate structures, quantifying historic emissions for the
application process, and verifying the applications were aggre-
gated, and then divided by the number of years in the first com-
mitment period and then allocated to the year 2005. The
transaction costs for the compilation and verification of the first
emissions report were also attributed to 2005, although they
arose in 2006, to ensure accordance with a cost-accrual concept.
The figures in Table 3 relate to the EUAs assigned, and not to the
EUAs returned in 2005, because this would have caused incon-
sistencies when accruing the cost partition of one-off13 costs to
the years 2006 and 2007. In regard to the different emissions lev-
els of the installations, the results are presented as specific trans-
action costs per EUA and per installation.
The specific costs per EUA differ by a factor of five, from
0.14 euro to 0.79 euro. Surprisingly, the lime works company
has the lowest transactions costs, which can only be explained by
relatively low expenditures for abatement, strategy, and trade.
The company’s emission management set-up costs have been
relatively moderate, which might be a result of the company’s
existing environmental management system that follows similar
management routines. Unlike utility companies, the lime works
company participates in a competitive market place and cannot,
or can only to a limited extent, pass on the additional costs from
the EU ETS to their customers. This fact might also have led to
greater cost-consciousness. 
The major utility’s transaction costs are about twice as high
than the lime work company’s due to high allocation fees and
frequent trade activities. The public services utility bears the
lowest absolute transaction costs in all categories but the highest
transaction cost per allocation at 0.79 euro. A comparison of the
cost figures per installation in Figure 1(b) shows that the major
utility bears highest costs as a result of high average emissions of
600,000 tons CO2 (See Table 2). This reflects the curbing effect
of frequency on the specific transaction cost per allocation.
FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF TRANSACTION COSTS
An analysis of transaction cost distribution clearly shows
that the one-time costs for the set-up of the emission trade are a
relatively low component (between four and twelve percent of
the total costs). The latter could increase by the end of the first
commitment period in 2008, when companies decide to acquire
software for the automation of processes. This was not an attrac-
tive option in the beginning, as compatibility definitions for the
software interface with the DEHSt were not available. Therefore,
companies integrated the processes of the EU ETS in their exist-
ing software environment instead of purchasing additional ones. 
The application’s high cost share (37 percent) for the public
services utility is astonishing. The category includes cost related
to initial training in the emissions trading scheme and this 
adds up to a rather high amount. It is likely that the cost for the
orientation in the new complex policy regime is of a similar
magnitude in other small companies with few installations.
Obviously, these learning costs will be much lower for the next
TABLE 3: TRANSACTION COSTS IN 2005
Emissions
management Application Fees Monitoring Reporting Abatement Strategy Trade Total
MU 0.03 c= 0.01 c= 0.08 c= 0.02 c= 0.02 c= 0.005 c= 0.02 c= 0.08 c= 0.27 c=
PS 0.05 c= 0.31 c= 0.07 c= 0.17 c= 0.07 c= 0.094 c= 0.00 c= 0.03 c= 0.79 c=
LW 0.01 c= 0.02 c= 0.04 c= 0,03 c= 0.04 c= 0.00 c= 0.00 c= 0.00 c= 0.14 c=
MU 18,519 c= 3,648 c= 44,612 c= 13,889 c= 13,889 c= 2,778 c= 13,889 c= 44,444 c= 155,667 c=
PS 1,633 c= 9,583 c= 2,158 c= 5,288 c= 3,800 c= 2,917 c= 0 c= 869 c= 26,248 c=
LW 857 c= 2,530 c= 7,375 c= 5,116 c= 6,073 c= 233 c= 78 c= 233 c= 22,496 c=I
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commitment period as companies will be familiar with the func-
tion of the EU ETS and will have experiences in trading. Simi-
larly, fees make up around one third of total transaction in the
major utility and lime works company, both enterprises with
high emissions levels. This is especially negative from a corpo-
rate point of view as there are limited possibilities to internally
decrease this share through efficiencies or other mechanisms.  A
simplified allocation scheme with fewer combinations of appli-
cation rules would have decreased the costs at the DEHSt
administrational level resulting in lower fees for the participants. 
The share of transaction costs due to monitoring and report-
ing is highest at the lime works company (23 percent and 27 per-
cent, respectively), which can be explained by more complex
monitoring procedures covering a wider product range, various
fuels and different productions methods. The public utility also
has a high transaction cost share for those two categories (twenty
percent and fourteen percent), but they can likely be accounted
to the low number of installations that prevent the company from
profiting from learning effects in the compilations of monitoring
schemes and emission reporting. 
Approximately one third (29 percent) of the transaction
costs observed at the major utility originate from trading per-
mits, which significantly differ from the other firms examined
(three percent for PS, one percent for LW). This is most likely
due to similarities in the core business of larger utilities that con-
stantly optimize their power generation capacities. The high
amount of allocated permits certainly enhances corporate possi-
bilities to take advantage of the emissions trade. The permit
trade is part of the day-to-day business just as much as electric-
ity trading at the major utility, and this compliments a higher
transaction cost share. Another surprising finding is the low level
of transaction costs at the lime works company that cannot be
explained with transaction cost theory. The higher costs at the
public services utility on the other hand are in line with theoreti-
cal assumptions regarding economies of scale, as there are only
two installations and relatively few EUAs allocated. The level of
transaction costs at the major utility can be well explained by the
more pro-active emission management and the voluminous trad-
ing activities. Apart from that it can be stated that the amount of
transaction costs corresponds well with other preliminary esti-
mates, but no extraordinarily high transaction costs of greater
than one euro per EUA was found. 
CONCLUSION
The varying results in transaction costs should encourage
companies to examine the structure of their emissions manage-
ment and to look for optimization potentials. Generally, sinking
transactions cost levels can be expected with increasingly ampli-
fying learning effects, but this will not be self-evident. Usually, a
simpler allocation scheme could contribute to decreasing trans-
action costs for the application and fees. Among the possibilities
to achieve this are permit auctions or a de-minimis rule for
reduced requirements for installations with low emissions level-
both are currently discussed in the policy formulation phase for
the second commitment period in Germany. Although the level
of transaction costs overall is moderate, a decrease would be
highly desirable—especially when they are compared to the cur-
rent spot price of permits of about 1.50 euro.
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